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AbstrAct
There is interdependence when the actions of an individual influence the decisions (and later actions) of other 
individuals. This paper claims that social networks define the structure of that range of influence and unleash 
a number of mechanisms that go beyond those captured by rational action theory. Networks give access to 
the ideas and actions of other individuals, and this exposure determines the activation of thresholds, the timing 
of actions, and the emergence of contagion processes, informational cascades and epidemics. This paper 
sustains that rational action theory does not offer the necessary tools to model these processes if it is not 
inserted in a general theory of networks. This is especially the case in the context opened by new information 
and communication technologies, where the interdependence of individuals is acquiring greater empirical 
relevance. 
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resumen
Existe interdependencia cuando las acciones de unos individuos influyen en las decisiones (y posteriores 
acciones) de otros individuos. Este artículo sostiene que las redes sociales definen la estructura de ese 
espacio de influencia y desatan una serie de mecanismos de los que la teoría de la elección racional no puede 
dar cuenta. Las redes sociales abren acceso a las ideas y acciones de otros individuos, y esta exposición 
determina la satisfacción de umbrales, el tempo con en el que se llevan a cabo las acciones y la emergencia 
de procesos de contagio, cascadas de información y epidemias. Este artículo defiende que la teoría de la 
elección racional no ofrece las herramientas necesarias para modelizar tales procesos si no se inserta en una 
teoría general de redes. Éste es especialmente el caso en unos momentos en los que la interdependencia de 
individuos está adquiriendo, al amparo de las nuevas tecnologías, mayor relevancia empírica.
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introduction
Rational action theory (RAT) and the analytical tools developed under its umbrella 
(in particular, game theory) has contributed to advance our understanding of social 
phenomena such as collective action or the emergence of norms (Olson 1965; Ullmann-
Margalit 1977; Hardin 1982; Axelrod 1984; Elster 1989; Coleman 1990; also Aguiar 
1990; Linares 2004; Miller 2007). By uncovering and formalising the micro-foundations 
on which collective dynamics are based, RAT has contributed to the generalisation of a 
powerful explanatory framework; however, its models have seldom taken into account 
the role (often counterintuitive) played by interdependence and by the network of 
interactions from where individuals decide and act. Networks open the channels through 
which social influence flows: they create the basic infrastructure that allows the formation 
of preferences or the emergence of social norms. An efficient and global diffusion of 
information, for instance, depends on the structure of the network connecting individuals: 
some are more efficient than others in spreading the reputation of future partners of 
interaction or in facilitating the enforcement of norms.  
 This paper aims to justify two claims: first, that RAT needs to be inserted in a general 
theory of networks if it is to explain the emergence of social processes like collective 
action; and second, that RAT models will be more relevant empirically if they make explicit 
assumptions about the networks that connect individuals, particularly in the light of recent 
episodes of mobilisation facilitated by the use of new technologies. The assumption that 
underlies these claims is that individuals do not decide or act in isolation: they observe 
what other individuals do and are influenced by their actions. This interdependence 
unfolds mechanisms that cannot be reduced to the analytical framework proposed by 
RAT: two choices or actions that are identical from the point of view of an individual 
might unleash completely different consequences depending on how those individuals 
are positioned in a global network of interactions (Goyal 2007: 25-26). The argument 
developed in this paper is not intended as a rebuttal of RAT models; instead, it aims to 
justify why it is necessary to insert them in a theory of networks. 
A model to illustrAte the exPlAnAtory role of networKs 
Networks generate a complexity that lies beyond the scope of the models proposed by 
the RAT. The model represented in Figure 1, a form of cellular automaton (Gilbert and 
Troitzsch 2005: p.), aims to illustrate why. In this model each cell can exhibit two possible 
states, identified by the colours black and white. If we assume that each cell represents 
an individual and that each state represents a particular voting intention (if white, the 
vote will go for candidate X, and if black, it will go for candidate Y), the model allows us 
to analyse the impact that different rules of decision and social influence will have on the 
final distribution of votes. In this example, the decision rule is simple: agents will look 
around, they will count the number of neighbours that intend to vote white and those 
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who intend to vote black, and will adopt the vote of the majority. What changes in the two 
scenarios represented in the figure is the definition of neighbourhood, that is, the number 
of neighbours that will influence a given agent when it comes to deciding which candidate 
to vote for. In scenario A agents take into account the eight neighbours surrounding them; 
in scenario B they only take into account the agents placed in the four cardinal points (N, 
S, E and W).
 The patterns reproduced in the upper part of the figure result from the evolution of the 
model, the starting point of which is the same in both scenarios: a random distribution of 
vote intentions. Every time step, agents follow the majority rule, until the system reaches 
Figure 1. 
The Influence of Networks in Social Processes like the Distribution of Votes
A B
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the equilibrium captured in the figure. As the figure shows, segregation is more extreme 
in the first scenario than in the second. This is arguably an obvious result given the 
specifications of the model. However, the evolution of this model hides mechanisms that 
are not so intuitive at first sight and that depend on the structure of the network underlying 
the interactions. The lower part of the figure reproduces the networks that operate in both 
scenarios for an hypothetical agent Z. Note that the configuration of the environment 
for this particular agent (represented by the grey cell) is identical in both cases; what 
changes is the network of contacts that the agent will observe when deciding how to cast 
her vote.  In the first case, the neighbourhood includes a majority of white votes, but in 
the second case, the black vote predominates. As a result, agent Z will choose white in 
scenario A and black in scenario B.
 In spite of its simplicity, this model captures one of the mechanisms that we can only 
identify if we analyse the networks that underlie agents’ interactions, namely the exposure 
that agents have to the choices and actions of other agents. The agent in scenario A has 
a wider exposure than the agent in scenario B simply because her network is larger. The 
expanded scope of influence to which agents in scenario A are subjected generates a 
higher segregation of votes.
 In addition to exposure, there are other network mechanisms that also influence social 
dynamics. This paper discusses these mechanisms by introducing, first, the theoretical 
debate about the role that networks play in the emergence of norms and collective action; 
the second section explores these network mechanisms in greater depth by considering 
different scenarios of interaction in which networks have been found to have a significant 
influence in individual and collective outcomes; the third section presents the mathematical 
models that have tried to formalise some of the relevant properties that networks have 
to exhibit to increase their efficiency and, finally, the paper concludes by discussing the 
impact that new technologies are having in the configuration and efficiency of social 
networks. Lines for future research are identified in the final section. 
the imPortAnce of networKs for collective Action
Social capital is one of the theories that have long emphasized the explanatory role of 
networks, especially in its application to the analysis of civil society (Putnam 1995, 2000; 
Paxton 1999, 2002). According to this theory, social networks are important because 
they promote the flow of information, instil habits of cooperation, and encourage political 
engagement (Putnam 2000: 338). Social networks contribute to create “feelings of duty, 
increase a sense of interdependence with others, and produce a habit of participation” 
at the same time that they increase “the exposure of individuals to political ideas 
and debates” (Paxton 2002: 258-9). Social capital theory sees in civic communities 
horizontal structures in which trust, solidarity and participation take place in what would 
be unsustainable levels in the absence of dense networks. Networks contribute to the 
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workings of civil society because they allow individuals to articulate communities based 
on norms, trust and reputation, that is, they enhance the auto-regulation of communities 
without the need of formalised authorities. 
 Networks, however, not only affect the strength of political engagement and the 
authority of civic communities. They are also structures that embody a distribution of 
power: networks open a differential access to the channels that facilitate the exchange 
of resources and the different positions that emerge from this  “largely determine the 
relative power of each actor in the network” (Knoke 1990: 9-10). To this view, power takes 
the form of centrality and prestige within the network, and it has political consequences 
because it affects the role actors have in the spread of information, publicity or tactics; 
it also affects individual access to these resources: “actors who are connected to other 
prominent actors gain power through their positional ability to tap into larger stores of 
useful political information” (p. 13). Being able to perform a gate-keeping role within the 
network, or to access the actors performing that role, is of crucial importance in a number 
of political scenarios. In the case considered here –the emergence of collective action— 
it is important for three reasons: recruitment, partnership and mobilisation. Having the 
right position within a structure of connections will facilitate the recruitment of individuals, 
the establishment of alliances with other organisations and, as a consequence of both, 
the coordination of collective action and social mobilisation. 
 It is an empirical matter to establish whether civil society is articulated by competitive 
structures or, as social capital theory claims, by horizontal networks governed by 
relations of trust and reciprocity. Social capital research does not really provide empirical 
information on civic networks (it focuses, instead, on level of association as a proxy to the 
density of ties), but a good portion of the literature on social movements favours, under 
the name of resource mobilisation theory, the former view. This theory draws attention 
“to how the distribution of organizational resources may affect the role played by different 
actors in a network, in particular, whether more central actors owe their position to a 
greater control of resources” (Diani 2003b: 316). Having the financial and organisational 
resources to mobilise individuals is a fundamental prior condition in the construction 
of civic networks that social capital theory does not account for. A key task from this 
perspective is to “understand how organised groups acquire collective control over 
resources needed for challenging the authorities and how these resources are applied 
to affect social and political changes” (Knoke 1990: 67). In this process of acquisition of 
control, the recruitment of individuals plays a crucial role and organisations depend on 
their networks to execute it. 
 Networks have been said to perform a threefold function in the recruitment process: 
first, by socialising individuals and enhancing their disposition to participate; second, by 
generating the opportunities for participation; and third, by affecting the ultimate decision 
to take part (Passy 2003). According to this view, networks mediate at the beginning 
and at the end of the participation process: “at the beginning by building or reinforcing 
individual identities that create potential for participation, and at the very end when 
individual preferences and perceptions [...] eventually prompt people to take action” 
NETWORKS AND MECHANISMS OF INTERDEPENDENCE • 541 
RIS, Vol. 67, Nº 3, SEPTIEMBRE-DICIEMBRE, 537-558, 2009. ISSN: 0034-9712
(Passi, 2003: 22). In the first phase, networks allow individuals to get ideologically closer 
to a given political issue; in the second, to be connected to opportunities for participation; 
and in the third, to access the information that will make them decide to join or not a 
collective action. In other words, networks allow potential participants to monitor others’ 
actions and be influenced by them. 
 The influence that social networks have over individual decisions has been 
analytically explored by the critical mass theory (Marwell and Oliver 1993; Marwell and 
Prahl 1988; Oliver and Marwell 1988; Oliver, Marwell and Teixeira 1985). This theory 
is based on the idea that “some threshold of participants or action has to be crossed 
before a social movement ‘explodes’ into being” (Oliver, Marwell and Teixeira 1985: 
523). The main assumption underlying this approach is that individual decisions are 
interdependent: they are sequential, and people take into account the actions previously 
taken by others when deciding how to act themselves. Yet networks not only provide 
the structure for that interdependence. They also influence the emergence of collective 
action by means of three of their features: their density, their centralisation and the costs 
of communicating across their ties (Marwell and Prahl, 1988: 505). It is centralisation –or 
how heterogeneous individuals are in their number of connections—what, according to 
these authors, generates the most relevant effect. When organising costs are high and 
resources are low, only some fraction of the agents to mobilise can be contacted; those 
agents whose contribution seems likely to be larger (because they are better connected) 
are preferred over the others, and this affects the speed and efficiency of the mobilisation 
process. As the authors say, “when resource heterogeneity is high, the number of others 
an organiser can afford to organise becomes much less significant as a constraint. If an 
organiser happens to have two or three big contributors in her network, she can achieve 
success without spending a lot of resources on organising” (p. 529). Since resources are 
scarce and connections costly, activating connections with those well connected brings 
higher outcomes for the same price. Yet this selectivity mechanism is based on networks 
that are closer to a hierarchy than to the horizontal structure so often assumed in civic 
networks. 
 One of the key concepts used by the critical mass theory –a threshold beyond 
which participation turns into collective action— was developed by Granovetter in 
the late 70s (Granovetter, 1978). His threshold models are an approach to collective 
behaviour for situations where actors have two alternatives and the costs and benefits 
of each depend on how many other actors have chosen one of them. The concept of 
threshold, though, was not incorporated into an explicit model of networks until the mid 
nineties (Valente 1996). Rather than measuring thresholds in terms of how many others 
in the whole system follow a certain action, this approach measures thresholds as the 
number of others in the personal network that act in a certain way. In other words, it 
relaxes Granovetter’s assumption of global information and complete connectedness, 
and introduces the concept of exposure to account for the proportion of actors in an 
individual’s personal network that follow the behaviour at a given time; the threshold is 
the exposure at the time of adoption. 
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 The relevance of this differentiation –the relevance of making an explicit incorporation 
of networks in threshold models– is the realisation that individuals with the same 
thresholds may adopt at different times because their exposure is different (Valente: 
1996:73). Two individuals with the same threshold but connected to networks of 
heterogeneous agents will not behave in a similar fashion: if individual A is connected to 
agents with low thresholds, she will act before individual B if he is connected to agents 
that are themselves reluctant to act. Agents A and B share the same threshold (that is, 
they have the same propensity to join) but the time when their threshold is activated 
depends on their contacts and on their respective thresholds. Likewise, individuals 
connected to wider networks, like the agent in scenario A of Figure 1, will need a higher 
number of agents joining a course of action before deciding to do the same; this number 
will be higher than that required for an individual with the same threshold but connected 
to a smaller network: the larger the number of contacts an agent has, the more of these 
contacts will need to act before the agent overcomes her reluctance to join. 
 The effects that these network features have on the emergence of collective action 
are important because they shape contagious processes: different network structures 
have different effects on the rhythm and scope of social influence. Empirical analyses 
have shown that networks played a great role in, for instance, the growth and spread of 
trade unions in the early twentieth century Sweden. These findings suggest that “spatial 
properties and network densities are likely to influence considerably both the speed 
of a mobilisation process and the success of a movement in organising the relevant 
population” (Hedström, 1994: 1176). Networks, this approach implies, determine how 
and when thresholds are satisfied; and thresholds define the frontier between the initial 
slow growth phase and the phase of logistic growth that characterise contagious curves; 
that is, they define the turning point that need to be overcome to attain the critical mass 
(for a non-technical approximation see Gladwell 2001; for a general approach to the 
role networks play in contagion processes see Watts 2003: chapter 6). Whether a small 
initial influence ends up being a global movement depends on networks, on how they 
channel the diffusion of dynamics and contagion. Also on how they promote the flow 
of information and on whether they allow the emergence of the so-called informational 
cascades. 
 According to the cascade approach “each individual action […] affects the information 
sets of other individuals who in the future may be either encouraged to take action or 
deterred from doing so” (Lohmann, 1994: 51). The informational cascade model states 
that collective action dynamics are generated endogenously by revealing information 
previously concealed; and it assumes that revelation comes by means of participation 
in public demonstrations, a turnout that needs to vacillate randomly: “if the number of 
political actions remains constant over time, no further information will be revealed, 
and consequently no individual will have incentives to turn out” (p. 54). The Monday 
demonstrations in Leipzig, which accelerated the collapse of the East German regime 
in 1989, stand as an example of this type of process: these demonstrations “publicly 
revealed some of the decentralised information about the malign nature of the East 
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German regime and thereby created pressures for political liberalisation and reform” (p. 
91). When information is dispersed, networks contribute to merge its flow by opening 
access to what otherwise would be trapped in unconnected islands of individuals, which 
prompts more people to enrich the information flow and therefore reinforces the process 
in a feedback fashion. Briefly, “what all information cascades have in common […] is that 
once one commences, it becomes self-perpetuating; that is, it picks up new adherents 
largely on the strength of having attracted previous ones” (Watts 2003: 206). The exact 
role that networks play in this process depends, again, on their structure. 
 The spread of information requires a trade-off between cohesion within groups and 
connections across them; that is, “a trade-off between local reinforcement and global 
connectivity” (p. 231), which is based on a distinction  similar to that social capital theory 
makes between bonding (exclusive) and bridging (inclusive) ties (Putnam 2000: 22). The 
success of the Leipzig demonstrations were based on tightly knit clusters of individuals 
(churchgoers, groups of friends) but also on the more casual encounters with others that 
joined the demonstration along its route:
“We know from the diary of one of the regular demonstrators that small groups of 
friends typically met on Monday afternoons in the city center, where they would join 
churchgoers and other strangers to form a demonstration. They would then proceed 
along the Ringstrasse, which encircles the center of the town, picking up additional 
people along the way” (Lohmann 1994: 67-68)
 Without those bridges or shortcuts overcoming the social distance between groups 
of closely related individuals, contagion processes and informational cascades cannot 
unfold. In their absence, networks can actually generate the opposite effect: an articulation 
of society around “concentric circles” (that is, clusters of ties with no external, bridging 
connections, Simmel [1908] 1955) or polarised groups, walled off from one another 
(Sunstein 2001). 
 Networks, then, contribute to the activation of collective action: they trigger 
endogenous mechanisms that traditional approaches to collective action, based on 
exogenous variables such as unemployment or other sources of relative deprivation, 
do not capture. There is large-scale empirical evidence about the role that those 
endogenous mechanisms play in the emergence of waves of contention (Biggs, 2005). 
These waves are based on mechanisms similar to those identified by threshold models, 
namely interdependence and positive feedback loops: “Positive feedback is inherent in 
the character of defiant collective action, because an individual’s decision to participate is 
strongly influenced by the action of others” (Biggs,2005:1688). If, as this approach claims, 
strikes lead to further strikes it is because influence flows between individuals, which 
implies connections and therefore networks. And even if there is no interdependence 
(when the expected benefits, moral pressure, and costs of participation depend on the 
action taken by other individuals) networks still play their role by means of inspiration (p. 
1689). The informational cascade that took place during the Monday demonstrations in 
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Leipzig was partly triggered by this inspiration mechanism: knowing that other citizens 
were protesting against the Regime encouraged more individuals to protest themselves, 
even though there was no direct connection or dependence between them other than 
common knowledge. 
 Why are networks, then, such a fundamental dimension in the articulation of collective 
action or the emergence of social norms? Because they provide the logistics to fulfil three 
crucial functions: the combination of different views, the prevention of concentrations 
of power, and the facilitation of civic mobilisation. But, as the literature reviewed so far 
shows, networks do not provide an unambiguous support to these functions. Competition 
between the different agents that form the network, the lack of heterogeneity in the 
resources available, or the absence of bridges connecting different groups are all 
elements that reflect on the structure of networks and therefore affect their functioning. 
Networks activate mechanisms that do not always benefit the plural and global diffusion 
of information, which in turn affects the decision of agents and the emergence of norms 
and collective action. The following section provides a more systematic account of the 
mechanisms that make networks, and their properties, so influential for social dynamics. 
networK mechAnisms And sociAl outcomes
Interdependence is the most basic mechanism by which networks affect social processes: 
it is connectedness what makes agents take into account the action previously taken by 
others and influence, in turn, other agents. This interdependence, though, takes different 
shapes and creates different structural positions: depending on the location within the 
global structure, agents will be able to activate (or not) the mechanisms that allow 
networks to fulfil a role within civil society. The previous section showed, for instance, 
that centralisation triggers a selectivity mechanism that enhances the efficiency of 
mobilisation processes: if agents A and B have resources to contact five other agents, 
but A’s contacts are much more diversified in their connections (and, in particular, in their 
number of connections), then the reach and impact of A’s call to mobilisation will be much 
wider. Another example was exposure, which influences the activation of thresholds 
by means of the structure of local networks: two agents with the same threshold will 
adopt a course of action, belief or idea at different times (and become an early-adopter 
or a follower) depending on their personal contacts, and on their own thresholds and 
connections. Network density was a third example of structural influence: the amount of 
connections in a network has an important impact on the speed of mobilisation processes 
because it affects how fast contagion unfolds; agents located in sparse networks have 
a clear disadvantage when it comes to promote mobilisation than agents located in 
denser networks. The right trade-off between cohesion within groups and connectivity 
across groups was, finally, another instance of how fundamental network properties are 
in promoting diffusion and cascades; again, due to this structural feature some agents 
(those connecting different groups) will play a preferential role over others.
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 There are lots of studies that confirm, in other areas, the relevance of these and other 
network properties in the activation of social mechanisms. The literature on occupational 
mobility, for instance, also emphasises the significance of those connections that span 
social distance between groups. Having access to individuals embedded in different local 
communities (embedded in different local clusters within a network) opens opportunities 
for information that would not be available otherwise. And this, according to the literature, 
has clear advantages in processes like job hunting (Granovetter 1973; Granovetter 
1995; also Flap and Boxman 2001; Lin, Cook and Burt 2001; Lin and Dumin 1986). 
The number of connections individuals have tells us how many sources of information 
these individuals can manage; and the strength of those connections, how diverse that 
information is: “those to whom we are weakly tied are more likely to move in circles 
different from our own and will thus have access to information different from that which 
we receive” (Granovetter 1973: 1371). Weak ties are the connections that link individuals 
who just meet occasionally, as opposed to friends and relatives, who are tied by much 
stronger ties. It is by virtue of those intermittent interactions that weak contacts become 
the sources of novel information, rich in new opportunities like, for instance, better jobs. 
Weak ties refer to the same network feature that the bridging ties identified by social 
capital literature, and play the same inclusive role. 
 Weak ties get their value from their ability to lay bridges across structural holes 
(Burt 1992; Burt 2005), a network feature that highlights the absence of connections 
between groups. Individuals spanning those holes have not only access to new sources 
of information but also the key to the control of its flow. Research on management 
networks has shown that this position actually grants a threefold competitive advantage 
to individuals: it provides an earlier access to information, a wider range of sources, 
and a better control over diffusion. In other words, the management of structural holes 
provides an opportunity for “the strategic deployment of information to create value” (Burt 
2005: 17). This competitive advantage translates into better performance and better 
promotional outcomes: in the managerial arena, individuals who occupy brokerage 
positions get better evaluations, higher compensations and faster promotions in their 
careers (p. 36-7).
 This very same research on management networks also highlights the importance 
that density has in promoting group cohesion and trust. When social ties among a group 
of individuals are dense, transitivity will also be higher: the denser a network, the closer 
everybody is to everybody else, and the higher the probability that someone’s strong 
contacts will also be strongly connected among themselves. When this happens, the 
network is said to exhibit closure, which stands just at the opposite pole of the continuum 
leading to brokerage and structural wholes. Networks exhibiting this property have been 
said to promote trustworthiness and social norms in a much more efficient fashion than 
open structures (Coleman 1988), and this is so because sanctions and reputation can 
only work if there are proper channels for the flow of information that allow monitoring 
(and guiding) others’ behaviour. It is precisely this feature what social capital theory 
echoes, as formulated by Putnam, when establishing the virtues of networks in generating 
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endogenous mechanisms of regulation. In complex organisations, closure stands as 
an alternative source of value to structural holes: it brings major returns by making it 
safe to trust (Burt 2005: 97). Closure, and the cohesion it promotes, makes information 
redundant and rapidly available to everybody, which is clearly an advantage not only to 
build reputations but also to get a fast transmission of news or calls for mobilisation.  
 Structural equivalence stands as yet another network property able to affect 
contagious processes like those explored in the previous section. In a classical study 
on the diffusion of medical innovations, networks were found to have a significant 
role in the adoption of a new drug. The doctors better embedded in their professional 
community (those with more ties with other doctors) used the drug, on average, earlier 
than the doctors less connected (Coleman, Menzel and Katz 1957). In a later study, 
the influence of networks in that process was reassessed in the light of two structural 
features: cohesion and structural equivalence (Burt 1987). The main question the study 
aimed to answer was whether physicians resolved the uncertainty of adopting the new 
drug by discussing its advantages and disadvantages with colleagues (cohesion) or by 
looking at the action taken by those occupying similar positions in the social structure 
(structural equivalence). The influence of cohesion hinged on informal social pressure; the 
influence of structural equivalence, on competition between individuals occupying similar 
hierarchical positions. When influenced by cohesion, individuals managed uncertainty by 
discussing the innovation with others; when influenced by structural equivalence, they 
overcame uncertainty by following the desire to compete with equals (Burt, 1987:1291). 
According to the conclusions of the study, structural equivalence was the leading force in 
the adoption of the new drug.
 More contemporary analyses have shown that this particular instance of innovation 
diffusion was actually driven by aggressive marketing efforts, rather than by contagion 
(van den Bulte and Lilien 2001). Yet this empirical finding does not invalidate the 
theoretical distinction between cohesion and structural equivalence: these two features 
promote the very same process but by means of very different mechanisms. Contagion 
by cohesion assumes that individuals choose under the influence of their advisers; 
contagion by structural equivalence assumes that individuals choose following their peers 
in the network hierarchy. While these two features generate the same effect (contagion 
and diffusion) they are based on mechanisms that entail a very different interpretation 
of risk, and a very different calculation of costs and benefits by the agents involved. A 
similar process might take place in the emergence of collective action, where instead of 
evaluating the adoption of a new drug, agents assess the costs and benefits of joining a 
particular course of action. 
 There are clear parallelisms in the literature on network mechanisms explored so 
far. Both occupational mobility and resource mobilisation theories highlight that some 
connections bring better resources than others. They draw attention to the fact that 
what waits at the other end of a connection is as important as the connection itself: the 
more resources in the hands of partners, the more resources will lie within reach. Ties, 
thus, carry a different weight depending on who sends them and who accepts to receive 
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them. The closure argument, on the other hand, is reflected in Putnam’s claim about the 
importance of networks for the generation of self-regulation devices such as trust, norms 
and sanctions. Both accounts see networks as horizontal structures where everybody is 
able to scrutinise and sanction everybody else, and where reputation and other sorts of 
information can travel fast. The role of density in processes of mobilisation and contagion 
is also reflected in the importance attributed to cohesion: it is in highly connected 
clusters where identities and group identification arise, and where coordination prevails 
over deviating actions. This is due to the enriched flow of information that transitivity 
provides –hence the importance of density to guarantee a good diffusion process. The 
opposite of cohesion and closure, structural holes, open, finally, the same opportunity for 
global diffusion than bridging ties: they are a precondition for bridges to play their role in 
connecting distant clusters in a network. 
 Networks create the opportunity to activate mechanisms that can impact the working 
of civil society. Yet their efficiency depends on what particular outcome is sought. 
Centralisation, for instance, facilitates civic mobilisation by means of the selectivity 
mechanism, but it goes against the function of preventing concentrations of power: the 
very same logic of this mechanism is based on a hierarchical structure. Additionally, 
centralisation might not promote the integration of diverse views if those who hold the 
key for a global connectivity are not activated properly. Bridges work to integrate parts 
of the network that would be unconnected otherwise: they work towards the integration of 
different views by providing agents with a better visibility, and also facilitate civil mobilisation 
to the extent that information is globally diffused. But their reverse, structural holes, also 
allow agents to play a brokerage role that they can use to their own advantage, which again, 
does not work in favour of preventing concentrations of power. 
 Exposure, in turn, depends not only on the structure and contents of local networks, but 
also on other global features such as structural equivalence. Exposure holds the key for 
the activation of thresholds, and therefore for the activation of mobilisation, but depending 
on what mechanism is at work –cohesion, based on neighbours, or competition, based 
on equals— the process will unfold more or less efficiently and, again, it might rely on a 
hierarchical structure rather than on a horizontal network. Finally, density and cohesion 
work on the assumption of horizontal structures and therefore do prevent concentrations 
of power while facilitating cooperation (and, potentially, mobilisation); but this is based 
on managing redundant information and explicitly excludes the function of merging diverse 
views. The efficiency of networks is thus filtered by the functions they are supposed to fulfil: it 
depends not only on their structural features, but also on the combination of these features. 
A definition of efficiency in line with that complexity is given in the following section. 
networK efficiency
A notion of efficiency has been implicitly used so far which is based on the ability of 
networks to spread information (or influence) faster, from a wider range of sources, 
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and to a broader range of individuals. This section aims to build on that definition by 
elaborating three more claims: first, that the efficiency of networks does not depend 
on just one attribute (ie. density) but rather on the right trade-off between two types of 
structural features: those enhancing local cohesion (like closure or transitivity) and those 
promoting global connectivity (like bridges or structural holes); second, that efficiency 
cannot be assessed independently of the function: the efficiency of networks in preventing 
concentrations of power, by means of ties and alliances between organisations, does not 
necessarily match the efficiency of networks in merging a diversity of views; and third, 
that the functionality of networks can only be established taking into account the costs 
associated to their maintenance. This section claims that if we are to use a definition 
of efficiency to assess the role networks play in the articulation of collective action, this 
definition cannot be based on the theoretical claims that see networks as horizontal 
communities but rather on those that see them as structures that embody power and 
strategy.  
 The literature on complex networks provides the strongest basis for the first claim. 
This approach offers a systematic account of the structural properties that make some 
networks more efficient than others, that is, more robust and faster in transmitting 
information. Considering a diversity of structures that range from regular to random 
graphs (from networks where each node has the same number of connections that all the 
other nodes, to networks where the connectivity is completely arbitrary), this approach 
highlights the properties of those networks that lie in between the extremes, the so-called 
small world and scale-free networks. 
 What makes small-world networks so characteristic is that they display a similar 
clustering coefficient to regular networks whilst achieving a similar path length to random 
networks; in other words, they exhibit high local density (typical of regular networks) and 
low global distance (typical of random graphs). These two features refer to the very same 
properties under the names of closure or cohesion and bridges or structural holes. The 
combination of these two properties makes networks especially efficient for a number 
of processes that involve the transmission of information or the propagation of signals 
or behaviour (Watts and Strogatz 1998: 440; also Watts 1999a). First, given the small-
world nature of these networks, any one of the nodes are at a short distance from any 
other, where distance is measured as the number of links or connections that need to be 
crossed before two nodes can be linked (Buchanan 2002; Milgram 1967; Watts 2003). 
And second, this provides the key for their efficiency: the short average distance between 
any pair of nodes allows a fast global spread at the same time that the high clustering 
coefficient guarantees a fast local propagation. 
 The possibility space that small-world networks open is, however, still wide, with 
some of those graphs displaying very different degree distributions –or different levels 
of heterogeneity in the number of connections per node. Scale-free networks embrace 
those graphs where most nodes have only a few connections but are held together into 
the same structure by a few hubs that have a disproportionately higher connectivity 
(Barabási 2002: 70-71). These networks follow an uneven distribution of ties, they do not 
NETWORKS AND MECHANISMS OF INTERDEPENDENCE • 549 
RIS, Vol. 67, Nº 3, SEPTIEMBRE-DICIEMBRE, 537-558, 2009. ISSN: 0034-9712
have an average node and therefore lack a representative scale of connectivity –hence 
their scale-free nature. Any pair of nodes in these networks is at a short distance because 
every node is only two or three steps away from a hub. Hubs are a minority of nodes that 
concentrate the majority of ties, and they are the key for the efficiency of these networks 
in the small-world sense (p. 135): since each hub is connected to a large number of other 
nodes, it has a high chance of receiving a piece of information that will be transmitted 
to an equally vast number of other nodes. These hubs or connectors are very similar in 
nature to the nodes identified by the selectivity mechanism in the critical mass theory. 
 Yet scale-free networks add a second element to the notion of efficiency: robustness. 
Scale-free networks display a higher robustness to failures thanks to their hub-based 
architecture: failures “do not discriminate between nodes but affect small nodes and 
large hubs with the same probability […] Therefore, if failures in networks affect with 
equal chance all nodes, small nodes are far more likely to be dismantled, since there 
are many more of them” (p. 113-114). In the event of random failure, hubs, in their 
minority, go unnoticed far more frequently than the rest of the nodes, increasing the 
network resilience to errors (this feature is, of course, a flaw rather than a virtue when 
the causes of disruption are intentional and not-random). At the same time, the costs 
associated to the creation and maintenance of ties are reduced without losing the small-
world properties: the total count of ties in scale-free networks is smaller: only a few hubs 
need to be highly connected; but the global connectivity is equally enhanced. Scale-free 
networks do not only have a higher robustness; they are also the cheapest way of getting 
resistance (to random failure) in a small world. 
 The relevance of these models, summarised in Table 1, is twofold. First, they 
contribute to build a general theory of networks in which to embed the RAT models 
(Goyal 2007). Cooperation games like the prisoners dilemma generate different results 
when agents interact in this type of networks as opposed to regular or random networks 
(a common assumption in the literature on game theory but empirically unrealistic). 
Second, these models provide an important benchmark to compare the efficiency of 
networks. This approach turns networks into structures that can be optimised to increase 
value and reduce the “logistic costs” associated to their maintenance. This highlights an 
aspect too often disguised in the claims made about the importance of networks in civil 
society: that growing and maintaining links is beneficial, but also costly, particularly when 
resources are scarce. As already mentioned before, features such as the heterogeneity 
of connections within a network is an advantage under resource constraints: having the 
opportunity to access agents with a greater impact of reach in a global structure of ties 
(the hubs, the brokers) becomes an asset in terms of diffusion and mobilisation. 
 What this approach to networks tells us, then, is that efficiency is not independent 
of costs; yet what it does not say, as resource mobilisation theories did, is that costs, 
or rather the ability to face them, are usually not the same for all the agents involved. 
Agents have different stocks of resources, and networks reflect their different strategies, 
interests and bargaining positions; that is, they reflect an asymmetrical distribution of 
power. Social networks are not decentralised, invisible-hand systems: they emerge in 
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a context that precedes them and which will determine their structure. A lot has been 
said about how the Internet and new communication technologies have relaxed these 
old dependencies by reducing the costs associated to the public function and granting a 
more egalitarian access to new forms of communication. The emergence of the Zapatista 
movement or the anti-globalisation protests that erupted in 1999 are two of the examples 
most often used in the literature to illustrate the positive impact of new technologies 
in articulating collective dynamics. The last two US presidential elections, where web 
technologies contributed greatly to shape the campaigns, is another example of how 
networks are becoming more relevant (and more visible) under the influence of the 
Internet. The following section aims to assess some of the claims made in the literature 
about the impact that ICTs are having on collective action, and determine to what extent 
they are changing the way social networks operate. 
the imPAct of the internet on the efficiency of networKs
Most of the claims made in the literature about the changes brought about by the Internet 
have to do with how it has affected the scope and effectiveness of the mechanisms 
identified so far. If “the forms and contents of information exchanges shape the capacity 
of individuals and groups to influence collective decisions” (Knoke 1990: 205), then the 
Internet has allowed reaching levels of influence never achieved before. Local initiatives 
can now be echoed globally, and disseminating information is much cheaper and 
faster: “the explosive growth of connectivity via the Internet alters the transmission of 
information among networks, shrinking costs, maximising speed, broadening reach, and 
eradicating distance” (Norris 2001: 20). In this new environment of “minimal-cost” and 
Table 1. 
Elements of Network Efficiency.
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“instantaneous global communications”, networks are said to play a more efficient role in 
widening individual exposure to information.
 First, interdependence now embraces more people than ever as connectedness is 
increasingly being less constrained by geographical proximity (Castells 2004a). If the 
action taken by other individuals matters when deciding what course of action to take, 
now the points of reference have grown along with the new methods for diffusing and 
accessing information. New technologies have changed “the geographical scope of the 
media and consequently alter the construction of collective identities. The globalization 
of information flows enlarges the group of people concerned” (Chambat 2000: 268). In 
other words, new technologies have multiplied the elements involved in the calculations 
that individuals make prior to their civic involvement. The number of others to which one 
is potentially connected is now larger, and information –the bullet points in the public 
agenda— is more diversified than ever.
 The shape of interdependence has, according to the literature, also changed: given 
the architecture of the Internet, civic networks can now become more decentralised and 
horizontal (Chadwick 2006: 22). As some have put it, it is not only that recent mass 
protests, like those against globalisation, “would have been impossible without the 
Internet”; it is also that “the communication technology that facilitates these campaigns 
is shaping the movement in its own image”, allowing the emergence of “an activist 
model that mirrors the organic, decentralized, interlinked pathways of the Internet” (Klein 
2002: 266). The constant exchange of information and the minimal costs associated to 
it are said to promote the establishment of ad hoc alliances that can evolve into more 
stable coalitions without requiring strict consensus or bureaucratic hierarchies. Density 
increases and, with that, the number of channels of communication and influence which, 
according to these theories, hampers the centralisation of resources: “the Net’s built-in 
resistance to centralized control makes it inherently more egalitarian and democratic 
than other forms of mass media” (Kolko 2003: 28). New technologies, these claims go, 
allow knitting denser and more horizontal networks, which provides all players with a 
fairer position to draw attention to their cause and have an impact. 
 However, none of these studies provides a robust empirical ground in which to 
root their enthusiasm; and, given the lack of empirical evidence, it is difficult to discern 
whether these claims are about technical possibilities or about actual usage. In fact, more 
recent approaches water down this optimistic view: “the professionalisation of web-based 
politics has massively increased costs since the early days of the mid-1990s, and though 
it is relatively simple to establish a website, this is no guarantee that users will flock to it” 
(Chadwick 2006: 23). The Internet provides the technical means to facilitate the diffusion 
of information and access to it, but it does not provide a guarantee that these possibilities 
will benefit all agents to the same extent. 
 The media has always been considered to play an important role in the activation of 
collective action because of its impact on diffusion and contagious processes. Traditional 
media, though, could only contribute to spread influence in places where people had 
access to their news and broadcast: events taking place in areas not covered by local 
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media stations were invisible, of null impact (Myers, 2000). These media gaps, either 
intentional or unintended, created firebreaks in the emergence of collective action that, 
according to the literature, have been minimised by the range of visibility that the Internet 
enables. The message of an uprising Zapatista movement, for instance, was projected 
globally, reaching the media focus of every major country in the planet, from the rather 
remote soil of the Mexican state of Chiapas (Cleaver ,1998; Shepard and Hayduk, 2002; 
Castells, 2004b: 75-87; Bob, 2005: 117-177). The anti-globalisation movements –which, 
for many, provide the ultimate evidence of the impact that the Internet has had on civil 
society— were greatly inspired by this indigenous struggle, and identified with many of 
their claims, despite these being rooted in very local circumstances which, in other times, 
would have been invisible to most. 
 If the influence of the media depends on how it is distributed and accessed, then the 
Internet has made an unequivocal contribution to increase the efficiency of networks. 
And this has had a positive influence on the coordination of mobilisation and collective 
action since it enables individuals “to find multiple points of entry into varieties of political 
action” (Bennett, 2003: 144). The combination of lower costs and higher exposure 
contributes to activate thresholds and spread actions in a faster and more efficient 
fashion, a possibility that has been realised in a number of occasions. The International 
Campaign to Ban Landmines, which was awarded with the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997, 
stands as an already classic example of how the Internet has increased the speed and 
efficiency of group mobilisation (Hajnal 2002: chapter 5; Klotz 2004: 86-7). The campaign 
attained an international treaty banning landmines just after six years of its foundation in 
1991. At the individual level, the most salient examples of Internet mobilisation revolve 
around protests against global trade. At the 1999 World Trade Organisation meeting, for 
instance, “Seattle police admit[ted] being unprepared for the level of Internet-enhanced 
coordination of 45.000 protesters” (Klotz 2004: 87). The episodes of mass protests where 
the Internet has played a crucial role have multiplied in the last years in a number of 
countries (Castells et al., 2006); and the impact of web technologies in formal politics has 
contributed to shift the balance of power amongst traditional actors (Castells 2009). The 
Internet and related technologies have increased the speed and efficiency required for 
the successful coordination of individual actions. This coordination would have required 
more time and many more resources had not been for the network logistics provided by 
electronic forms of communication. And, this paper has argued, only a theory of networks 
can explain the success (or failure) of the collective dynamics sustained by these new 
platforms of interaction.  
conclusion
If people are influenced by what others do, “the Internet is an obvious breeding ground 
for cascades” (Sunstein 2001: 84): it has optimised the networks connecting individuals 
by widening the scope of communication and reducing the costs associated to it. The 
emergence of the Internet has made more explicit than ever the relevance that networks 
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have in the articulation of social phenomena like collective action. If we do not take into 
account the structure that links individuals, and how that structure unleashes mechanisms 
of social influence, it will not be possible to explain satisfactorily the emergence of 
norms and collective action – even less in the scenario opened up by new technologies 
which, as the previous section illustrated, presents already some examples difficult to 
explain exclusively in the terms proposed by the RAT. This paper has presented some 
conceptual tools that can help us provide a more satisfactory explanation of these 
empirical phenomena.
  One of the advantages of analysing Internet-based interactions is that they provide 
observational network data with a resolution that was previously very difficult, if not 
impossible, to get (Watts, 2007). Using this data we can develop models that not only 
capture the structural properties of whole systems of interaction but also their evolution 
over time, which can give us unprecedented insight into the mechanisms that underlie their 
dynamics (see, for instance, Lewis et al., 2009). But using electronic data also creates 
new challenges that we need to solve to incorporate their analysis into our theoretical 
understanding of collective phenomena. These challenges have to do with measurement 
and validity issues (i.e. how do online networks differ from offline networks, or how do they 
relate to each other) but also with problems of identity and privacy (i.e. how do we know 
if online users are who they claim to be). On this methodological level, we need to devise 
protocols that can help us standardise research on online phenomena. But, perhaps 
most importantly, we also need to redefine the models that, on a theoretical level, see 
individuals as isolated decision-makers, and insert them in structures of interaction able 
to reproduce empirical patterns. Under the influence of new technologies, networks are 
becoming not only more relevant but also more visible and tangible for researchers. This 
paper has presented the theoretical tools that can help us advance our understanding of 
how these networks work. 
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